

# Le sfide della transizione ecologica

## Il cambiamento climatico e gli effetti economici sul sistema finanziario

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Le opinioni espresse sono personali e non rappresentano necessariamente le istituzioni di appartenenza

1. Cos'è il cambiamento climatico
2. Gli effetti economici e i canali di trasmissione
3. Il finanziamento della transizione
4. Gli effetti distributivi delle politiche climatiche

# 1. Cos'è il cambiamento climatico

I gas a effetto serra (GHG) hanno permesso la vita sulla terra (senza, temp = **-18°C**)




Quando bruciamo idrocarburi (energia solare immagazzinata) emettiamo "troppi" gas serra




La concentrazione di GHG nell'atmosfera aumenta la temperatura del pianeta

# I «serbatoi» di carbonio



# La concentrazione di CO<sub>2</sub> è su livelli storicamente elevati...


CO<sub>2</sub> during ice ages and warm periods for the past 800,000 years



# .. e le anomalie nella temperatura globale aumentano

## Global Land and Ocean


### January–December Temperature Anomalies



Deviazione della temperatura globale rispetto alla media del 20 esimo secolo (1901-2000)

Fonte: [NOAA](https://www.noaa.gov/), 2021

... nonostante il coronavirus...



**April 2021: 419.05 ppm**

**April 2020: 416.45 ppm**

... e un cigno nero è sempre in agguato..


CO2 conc. (ppm)	400	450	500	550	600	650	700	750	800
Median temp increase (C°)	1,3	1,8	2,2	2,5	2,7	3,2	3,4	3,7	3,9
Prob temp > 6°C	0,04%	0,3%	1,2%	3%	5%	8%	11%	14%	17%

Concentrazione pre rivoluzione industriale: 260 ppm

Fonte: [Wagner e Weitzman \(2015\)](#)

## 2. Gli effetti economici e i canali di trasmissione


# Gli effetti attesi del cambiamento climatico in Italia



# Welfare loss from climate change impacts

JRC PESETA IV conducted an economic analysis of climate change impacts on river and coastal flooding, agriculture, droughts and energy supply. Welfare impacts are estimated as if the future climate affects the economy of nowadays.


## UK & IRELAND




## NORTHERN EUROPE




## CENTRAL EUROPE (NORTHERN)



## CENTRAL EUROPE (SOUTHERN)




## SOUTHERN EUROPE



## Welfare losses in EU & UK (bn€)

If human mortality impacts were included, the estimated welfare losses in EU & UK would become much larger for all scenarios (an increase to 41.9bn€ at 1.5 °C, 82.6bn€ at 2 °C and 175.9bn€ at 3 °C)



## Far greater impact on southern Europe


The magnitude of welfare losses in southern regions is estimated to be several times larger compared to northern regions.

## Mitigation makes a difference

Limiting warming to 2 °C would reduce the welfare losses by 70% compared to a 3 °C scenario, while achieving the Paris goal of 1.5 °C would lower the welfare losses by 90%




The assessment does not evaluate the full economic impacts of climate change in Europe as not all possible climate impacts were analysed.



# Drought in a changing climate

A **first-ever** pan-European quantitative assessment of the economic impacts of drought in Europe.



Modelled expected annual losses (billion €) for the present (1981 - 2010)

Mediterranean	Atlantic region	Continental	Boreal
3.6	2.5	2.6	0.3

Projected expected annual damages (billion €) based on socioeconomic conditions in 2100 and without adaptation, at:



## IMPACT ON SECTORS CONSIDERED



### Agriculture

- Damages to crops and livestock losses
- Irrigation restrictions due to water scarcity



### Power generation

- Reduction in hydroelectricity production
- Reduced capacity of cooling systems
- Possible shutdown of thermal and nuclear power plants



### Public water supply

- Decreasing water availability
- Increasing competition amongst different sectors



### Commercial shipping

- Interruption of navigation
- Reduction in cargo maximum capacity
- Transfer to other means of transportation



### Buildings and infrastructure


- Damages due to soil subsidence
- Aquifer over-exploitation may aggravate damage to buildings from subsidence

## Share of drought losses per socioeconomic sector (%)

Present



2100



## KEY SUMMARY

- Drought will be more severe and persistent in southern and western Europe, whereas it will become less intense in northern and eastern Europe.
- Mediterranean and Atlantic regions are already contributing to about 68% of present losses, and this share will become 87% at 3 °C.
- Agriculture sector is most affected now and in the future, even if its economic importance is reduced in future European economies.

# Perdite economiche da eventi climatici estremi in Europa

**Tra il 1980 e il 2019, eventi climatici estremi\* hanno provocato in Europa (EEA-33):**

- 92 mila morti
- danni per 446 miliardi di euro (36% coperti da assicurazione)
- 3% eventi responsabile 60% perdite
- Media perdite annue in crescita: 6,6 mld nel 1980-89, 12,3 nel 1990-99, 13,2 nel 2000-09, 12.5 nel 2010-19
- Per Italia:
  - danni per 72,5 miliardi, di cui solo 2,9 coperti da assicurazioni e 20.735 morti

Source: EEA (2021), [Economic losses from climate-related extremes in Europe](#)

**\*la quota riferita a eventi geofisici (terremoti, eruzioni, tsunami) è del 20%**

## Arctic Circle oil spill prompts Putin to declare state of emergency

🕒 4 June 2020




🔗 Share



AFP

The leaked diesel oil drifted some 12km (7.5 miles) from the site of the accident

# Il cambiamento è in corso (2): invasione di locuste in Africa orientale e M.O.



# Il cambiamento è in corso (3): incendi eccezionali in Australia




**BBC NEWS**



### 3. Il finanziamento della transizione

# La Transizione non è un pranzo di gala (1)


## Key clean technologies ramp up by 2030 in the net zero pathway



Note: MJ = megajoules; GDP = gross domestic product in purchasing power parity.

# La Transizione non è un pranzo di gala (2)

**Figure 2.22** ▶ Annual average capital investment in the NZE



IEA. All rights reserved.

*Capital investment in energy rises from 2.5% of GDP in recent years to 4.5% by 2030; the majority is spent on electricity generation, networks and electric end-user equipment*


Fonte: [IEA, 2021](#)

nuclear energy is the elephant in the living room.....

# La domanda di minerali sarà cruciale...

Mineral demand for clean energy technologies would rise by at least four times by 2040 to meet climate goals, with particularly high growth for EV-related minerals

Mineral demand for clean energy technologies by scenario




IEA. All rights reserved.

Fonte: [IEA, 2021](#)

# ... e pone delle sfide geopolitiche rilevanti


Production of many energy transition minerals today is more geographically concentrated than that of oil or natural gas

Share of top three producing countries in production of selected minerals and fossil fuels, 2019




Fonte: [IEA, 2021](#)

# Andamento delle emissioni in Italia in base agli impegni presi



... e più aspettiamo, più la transizione sarà drastica ...

### CO<sub>2</sub> mitigation curves: 1.5°C



Since such steep mitigation is impossible, the only way to achieve this budget is with very large "negative" emissions: pulling CO<sub>2</sub> out of the atmosphere.

# I rischi finanziari indotti dal cambiamento climatico (CRFR)

## Due tipi di climate related financial risks (CRFRs)

**Physical risk** refers to the financial impact of a changing climate, including more frequent **extreme weather events and gradual changes in climate**, as well as of environmental degradation, such as air, water and land pollution, water stress, biodiversity loss and deforestation. **PIU DIFFICILE DA MISURARE, LONG TERM, GRANDE INCERTEZZA SU SCIENZA**

**Transition risk** refers to an institution's financial loss that can result, directly or indirectly, from the **process of adjustment towards a lower-carbon** and more environmentally sustainable economy. This could be triggered, for example, by a relatively **abrupt** adoption of climate and environmental policies, technological progress or changes in market sentiment and preferences. **PIU FACILE DA MISURARE (ES TRAMITE CARBON PRICE SHOCK)**

*Guide on climate-related and environmental risks (SSM, Nov. 2020)*

# The transition to net zero emissions won't be easy

- IEA (2021), [Net zero emissions \(NZE\) by 2050](#):
  - 2020-2030 is the crucial decade;
  - 2030 targets: all the required technologies are already available;
  - 2050 targets: half of the technologies are still prototype or unknown (especially heavy industries and long-distance transport);
  - Decarbonization is a massive process (involving a lot of resources)



# How to channel private sector money?

1. Increase sustainability disclosure
2. Classification of investments (taxonomies) to avoid greenwashing

# Increase sustainability disclosure

1. Data demand for sustainable pieces of information is growing but lack of standardized and comparable data/auditing and verification process;
  - > [IFRS Foundation is working on](#) an International Sustainability Standards Board (ISSB)
2. Few reports and:
  - datapoints from private data provider are uncorrelated (especially scope 3 - [Busch et al. 2020](#));
  - advanced methods such as ML still require underlying microdata (e.g. energy demand ([Nyugen et al. 2021](#)))
  - > Mandatory reporting (e.g. EU [Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive](#))
3. Grant data access to increase transparency (e.g. the forthcoming [European single access point - ESAP](#)) using common identifiers (e.g. LEI for companies, ISIN for securities);
4. Data gaps: forward-looking data (e.g. targets/emissions pathways) and granularity (assets geographical location or economics)



# Classification of sustainable activities/investments

Objective: avoid greenwashing and foster consistent (and comparable) data collection

- Existing classifications ([OECD, 2020](#)):
  - Netherlands' "[Green funds](#)" scheme (1995)
  - France's "[Greenfin](#)" label (2015)
  - China's [Green Bond Endorsed Projects Catalogue](#) (2015, new 2020 Edition)
  - Japan's [green bond guidelines](#) (2017)
  - Climate Policy Relevant Sectors (CPRS; [Battiston](#) et al. 2017)
  - EU [Taxonomy for sustainable activities](#) (2020)
  - [Climate bond standards](#) and ICMA [Green bond principles](#) (GBPs)
- Prospective: EU-Green bond standards ([EU-GBS](#))
- Open issues:
  - green vs. brown taxonomy (e.g. [CCrS](#));
  - economic activities vs. financial products
  - updates; data availability; usability vs. coherence;
  - minimally accepted [global](#) taxonomy ([IPSF](#) and [G20-SFWG](#))

# The EU taxonomy for sustainable activities

Uses and users of the Taxonomy		
	Disclosure obligations	Optional additional uses
<b>Pensions and Asset Management</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>UCITS funds:                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>equity funds;</li> <li>exchange-traded funds (ETFs);</li> <li>bond funds</li> </ul> </li> <li>Alternative Investment Funds (AIFs):                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>fund of funds;</li> <li>real estate funds;</li> <li>private equity or SME loan funds;</li> <li>venture capital funds;</li> <li>infrastructure funds;</li> </ul> </li> <li>Portfolio management.</li> </ul>	
<b>Insurance</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Insurance-based investment products (IBIP)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Insurance</li> </ul>
<b>Corporate &amp; Investment Banking</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Securitisation funds*</li> <li>Venture capital and private equity funds</li> <li>Portfolio Management</li> <li>Indices funds</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Securitisation</li> <li>Venture capital and private equity</li> <li>Indices</li> <li>Project finance and corporate financing</li> </ul>
Retail banking		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Mortgages</li> <li>Commercial building loans</li> <li>Car loans</li> <li>Home equity loans</li> </ul>

## Characteristics:

- green taxonomy;
- static;
- granular (singola attività);
- Financial investments;
- binary;
- 6 environmental objectives

## Sustainable activity if:

1. contributes substantially to at least one of the six environmental objectives;
2. does not significantly harm (DNSH);
3. compliance with the minimum safeguards;
4. it complies with technical screening criteria (TSC).

## 4. Gli effetti distributivi delle politiche climatiche

## Carbon pricing as an optimal tool

- A global carbon price is the economists' recommended choice to tackle climate change (Tirole, 2017);
- carbon pricing should reflect the global social cost of carbon (SCC), i.e the monetary value caused by an additional ton of greenhouse gas emitted (Tol 2019);
- though there are several methodological issues on identifying the "right price" (see Pindyck 2013 and 2017; Cortes et al. 2020);
- two types of carbon pricing: set Q (ETS) or P (carbon tax);
- currently 64 carbon pricing initiatives in place, either ETS (29 initiatives, 16% world GHG covered) or carbon tax (35 initiatives, 5.5% GHG - World Bank, 2021);
- In EU-27 + Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway, the EU-ETS covers 45% of all the GHG emissions; local schemes (e.g. Sweden carbon tax) exist in half of the member states.

# A carbon tax in Italy

- Italy belongs to the EU-ETS; currently, there is no national carbon pricing scheme;
- we choose to focus on 4 possible CTs: €50 (current EU-ETS), €100 (COP21 compliant), €200 and €800 (peak values *orderly* and *disorderly* NGFS scenarios);
- we use the specific carbon emission factors from official sources for each fuel to estimate the impact of each carbon tax on final energy prices;

carbon emission factors per fuel  
*ton CO<sub>2</sub> per GJ*

Electricity	Heating	Petrol	Diesel
0.078167	0.055820	0.067903	0.068301

## Effects of the CT on final energy prices

€ per ton of CO2	Carbon taxes			
	50	100	200	800
Price variation				
Electricity	+6.3	+12.6	+25.2	+100.8
Heating	+11.8	+23.6	+47.2	+188.7
Transport fuels	+7.9	+15.9	+31.8	+127.2
% change compared with the baseline year (2018)				

Using 2018 prices as baseline, the introduction of a carbon tax of e50 per ton, is equivalent to add: e0.014 to each kWh of electricity (+6 per cent); e2.8 to each GJ of gas (+12 per cent) and e0.12 to each litre of gasoline or gasoil (+8 per cent).

## Results of the simulations (1 out of 2)

€ per ton of CO2	Carbon taxes			
	50	100	200	800
Energy demanded				
Electricity	-1.7	-3.4	-6.3	-19.6
Heating	-5.1	-9.7	-17.7	-48.1
Transport fuels	-2.6	-5.1	-9.5	-28.3
Total energy demand	-4.2	-7.7	-13.8	-38.0
Expenditure				
Electricity	+4.5	+8.9	+17.3	+61.6
Heating	+6.6	+12.6	+22.9	+54.1
Transport fuels	+5.1	+10.0	+19.2	+62.6
Total energy expenditure	+5.4	+10.6	+20.0	+59.8
Total expenditure	+0.5	+1.0	+2.0	+5.9

## Results of the simulations (2 out of 2)


€ per ton of CO2	Carbon taxes			
	50	100	200	800
Effect on inflation (2018)*	+0.7	+1.4	+2.8	+11.3
CO2 Emissions and revenues				
% var	-3.7	-7.0	-12.9	-36.4
Emissions ( $\Delta$ MtCO <sub>2</sub> e)	-4.8	-9.3	-17.0	-48.0
Revenues (billion of €)	+4.2	+8.2	+15.5	+42.1

\* Additional percentage points to the Italian consumer price index (NIC).

(Total GHG emissions in 2018: 438 MtCO<sub>2</sub>eq - 112 from HHs)

# Greater reduction in energy demand for poorer households


HHs energy demand under € 50 and € 100 CT: by exp. quintile  
Change compared with the case of no CT



1= poorer households; 5=richer households; 99= all households

# Carbon tax would be regressive

Total household exp. under different CT: by exp. quintile  
Change compared with the case of no CT



1= poorer households; 5=richer households; 99= all households

# Conclusions

- we develop a microsimulation model for energy demand in Italy;
- short run demand is inelastic; long run demand is elastic;
- a carbon tax will significantly affects HHs, especially energy poor, abate up to 13% of total emissions and raise up to € 15.5 billion;
- revenue-recycling to mitigate effects on more vulnerable households (and increase policy acceptance).

Grazie per l'attenzione

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