

## CHAPTER 1

### *Nuestra America*

### *Postcolonial Identities and Mestizajes*

IN THIS CHAPTER I argue that there were at least two twentieth centuries, the European American twentieth century and the *Nuestra America* twentieth century. I am aware that there were others in Africa and Asia and even in Europe, but I will focus here on the first two and mainly on the second. My argument is that the European American twentieth century, which carried so many promises of democracy and welfare and experienced devastating wars in Europe and elsewhere, ended with the disturbing rise of what I call *societal fascism*, very often disguised under the name of hegemonic globalization. On the margins of this century, another evolved, the *Nuestra America* century. I argue that the alternative to the spread of societal fascism is the construction of a new pattern of local, national, and transnational relations. Such a pattern entails a new transnational political culture embedded in new forms of sociability and subjectivity. Ultimately, it implies a new insurgent cosmopolitan politics, law, and culture. I see in the *Nuestra America* century the seeds of new emancipatory energies, which I have been calling counterhegemonic globalization (Santos 1995: 252–268).

### **The European American Century and the Rise of Societal Fascism**

According to G. W. F. Hegel, we recall, universal history goes from the East to the West. Asia is the beginning, while Europe is the ultimate end of universal history, the place where the civilizational trajectory of humankind is fulfilled. The biblical and medieval idea of the succession of empires (*translatio imperii*) becomes for Hegel the triumphal way of the Universal Idea. In each era a people takes on the responsibility of conducting the Universal Idea, thereby becoming the historical universal people, a privilege that has in turn passed from the Asian to the Greek, to the Roman, and, finally, to the German peoples. America, or rather, North America, carries, for Hegel, an ambiguous future in that it does not collide with the utmost fulfilling of the universal history in Europe. The future of (North) America is still a European future, made up of Europe's leftover population.

This Hegelian idea was behind the dominant conception of the twentieth century as the American century: the European American century. Herein implied was the notion that the Americanization of the world, starting with the Americanization of Europe itself, was but an effect of the European, universal cunning of reason, which, having reached the Far West and being unreconciled with the exile to which Hegel had condemned it, was forced to turn back, walk back upon its own track, and once again trace the path of its hegemony over the East. Americanization, as a hegemonic form of globalization, was thus the third act of the millennial drama of Western supremacy. The first act, to a large extent a failed act, was the Crusades, which initiated the second millennium of the Christian era; the second act, beginning halfway through the millennium, comprised the "discoveries" and subsequent European expansion. In this millennial conception, the European American century carried little novelty; it was nothing more than one more European century, the last of the millennium. Europe, after all, had always contained many Europes, some of them dominant, others dominated. The United States of America

was the last dominant Europe; like the previous ones, it exerted its uncontested power over the dominated Europes. The feudal lords of eleventh-century Europe had and desired as little autonomy vis-à-vis Pope Urban II, who recruited them for the Crusades,<sup>1</sup> as the European Union countries of our time have vis-à-vis the United States, as illustrated by the multiple NATO missions in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Libya.

In these conditions it is hard to think of any alternative to the current regime of international relations, which has become a core element of what I call *hegemonic globalization* (Santos 1995). However, such an alternative is not only necessary but urgent, since the current regime, as it loses coherence, becomes more violent and unpredictable, thus enhancing the vulnerability of subordinate classes, social groups, regions, and nations. The real danger, as regards both intra- and international relations, is the emergence of what I call societal fascism. Fleeing from Germany a few months before his death, in 1940 Walter Benjamin (1968) wrote his “Theses on the Philosophy of History” prompted by the idea that European society lived at that time in a moment of danger. I think today we live in a moment of danger as well. In Benjamin’s time the danger was the rise of fascism as a political regime. In our time, the danger is the rise of fascism as a societal regime. Unlike political fascism, societal fascism is pluralistic and coexists easily with the democratic state; its privileged time-space is, rather than national, both local and global.

Societal fascism is a set of social processes by which large bodies of populations are irreversibly kept outside or thrown out of any kind of social contract. They are rejected, excluded, and thrown into a kind of Hobbesian state of nature, either because they have never been part of any social contract and probably never will (I mean the precontractual underclasses everywhere in the world, the best example of which are probably the youth of urban ghettos, the *indignados*, and participants in the Occupy movement) or because they have been excluded from or thrown out of whatever social contract they had been part of before (I

mean the postcontractual underclasses, millions of post-Fordist workers, and peasants after the collapse of land-reform or other development projects).

As a societal regime, fascism manifests itself as the collapse of the most trivial expectations of the people living under it. What we call society is a bundle of stabilized expectations from the subway schedule to the salary at the end of the month to employment at the end of a college education. Expectations are stabilized by a set of shared scales and equivalences: for a given amount of work, a given amount of pay; for a given crime, a given punishment; for a given risk, a given insurance. The people who live under societal fascism are deprived of shared scales and equivalences and therefore of stabilized expectations. They live in a constant chaos of expectations in which the most trivial acts may meet with the most dramatic consequences. They run many risks, and none of them are insured. The case of Gualdino Jesus, a Pataxó Indian from northeastern Brazil, symbolizes the nature of such risks. It happened some years ago and is mentioned here as a parable of societal fascism. He had come to Brasília to take part in the march of the landless. The night was warm, and he decided to sleep on a bench at a bus stop. In the early morning hours, he was killed by three middle-class youths, one the son of a judge and another the son of an army officer. As the youngsters confessed later to the police, they killed the Indian for the fun of it. They “didn’t even know he was an Indian, they thought he was a homeless vagrant.” Elsewhere I distinguish five main forms of societal fascism:<sup>2</sup> the fascism of social apartheid, contractual fascism, territorial fascism, the fascism of insecurity, and financial fascism (more on this in [Chapter 4](#)).

One possible future is therefore the spread of societal fascism. There are many signs that this is a real possibility. If the logic of the market is allowed to spill over from the economy to all fields of social life and to become the sole criterion for successful social and political interaction, society will become ungovernable and ethically repugnant, and whatever order is achieved will be fascistic, as indeed Joseph Schumpeter (1962 [1942]) and Karl Polanyi (1957 [1944]) predicted decades ago.



### **The *Nuestra America* Century**

At the margins of the European American century, as I argue, another century, a truly new and American century, emerged. I call it the *Nuestra America* century. While the former carried hegemonic globalization, the latter contained in itself the potential for counterhegemonic globalizations. In the following section I analyze the baroque ethos, conceived of as the cultural archetype of *Nuestra America* subjectivity and sociability. My analysis highlights some of the emancipatory potential of a new insurgent cosmopolitan politics, culture, and law based not on the ideas of European universalism but rather on the social and political culture of social groups whose everyday lives are energized by the need to transform survival strategies into sources of innovation, creativity, transgression, and subversion. In the last sections of the chapter I try to show how this emancipatory counterhegemonic potential of *Nuestra America* has so far not been realized and how it may be realized in the twenty-first century. Finally, I identify five areas, all of them deeply embedded in the secular experience of *Nuestra America*, that in my view will be the main contested terrains of the struggle between hegemonic and counterhegemonic globalizations, thus the playing field for a new transnational political culture and the insurgent cosmopolitan law that legitimates it. In each of these contested terrains the emancipatory potential of the struggles is premised on the idea that a politics of redistribution of social and economic wealth cannot be successfully conducted without a politics of recognition of difference, and vice versa.

To my mind, the *Nuestra America* century has best formulated the idea of social emancipation based on the metaright to have rights and on the dynamic equilibrium between recognition and redistribution presupposed by it. It has also most dramatically shown the difficulty of constructing successful emancipatory practices on that basis.

### **The Founding Ideas of *Nuestra America***

“Nuestra America” is the title of a short essay by José Martí, published in the Mexican paper *El Partido Liberal* on January 30, 1891. In this article, which is an excellent summary of his thinking as found in several Latin American papers at the time, Martí expresses the set of ideas that I believe were to preside over the *Nuestra America* century, ideas later pursued by many others, among them José Mariátegui and Oswald de Andrade, Fernando Ortiz, and Darcy Ribeiro, and influential in many grassroots movements and revolutionary changes that occurred throughout the twentieth century.

The main ideas in this agenda are as follows. First, *Nuestra America* is at the antipodes of European America. It is the *mestiza* America founded at the often violent crossings of European, Indian, and African blood. It is the America that is capable of delving deeply into its own roots and thereby of edifying the kinds of knowledge and government that are not imported but rather are adequate to its reality. Its deepest roots are the struggle of the Amerindian peoples against their invaders, where we find the true precursors of the Latin American *independentistas* (Retamar 1989: 20). Asks Martí, “Is it not evident that America itself was paralyzed by the same blow that paralyzed the Indian?” And he answers, “Until the Indian is caused to walk, America itself will not begin to walk well” (1963–1966: 8:336–337). Although in “Nuestra America” Martí deals mainly with anti-Indian racism, elsewhere he refers also to blacks: “A human being is more than white, more than mulatto, more than black. Cuban is more than white, more than mulatto, more than black.... Two kinds of racist would be equally guilty: the white racist and the black racist” (1963–1966: 2:299).

The second idea about *Nuestra America* is that in its mixed roots resides its infinite complexity, its new form of universalism from below that made the world richer. Says Martí, “There is no race hatred because there are no races” (1963–1966: 6:22). In this sentence reverberates the same radical liberalism that had encouraged Simon Bolívar to proclaim

that Latin America was “a small humankind,” a “miniature humankind.” This kind of situated and contextualized universalism was to become one of the most enduring leitmotifs of *Nuestra America*.

In 1928, the Brazilian poet Oswald de Andrade published his *Anthropophagous Manifesto*. By “anthropophagy” Andrade meant the American’s capacity to devour all that was alien to him and to incorporate all so as to create a complex identity, a new, constantly changing identity:

Only what is not mine interests me. The law of men. The law of the anthropophagous.... Against all importers of canned consciousness. The palpable existence of life. Pre-logical mentality for Mr. Levy-Bruhl to study.... I asked a man what is law. He said it is the guarantee of the exercise of possibility. This man’s name was Galli Mathias. I swallowed him. Anthropophagy. Absorption of the sacred enemy. To turn him into totem. The human adventure. Earthly finality. However, only the pure elites managed to accomplish carnal anthropophagy, the one that carries with itself the highest meaning of life and avoids the evils identified by Freud, the catechetical evils. (1990 [1928]: 47–51)

This concept of anthropophagy, ironic in relation to the European representation of the “Carib instinct,” is quite close to the concept of transculturation developed by Fernando Ortiz (1973) in Cuba somewhat later (1940). For a more recent example, I quote the Brazilian anthropologist Darcy Ribeiro in a burst of brilliant humor:

It is quite easy to make an Australian: take a few French, English, Irish, and Italian people, throw them on a deserted island, they kill the Indians and make a second-rate England, damn it, or third-rate, that shit. Brazil has to realize that that is shit, Canada

is shit, because it just repeats Europe. Just to show that ours is the adventure of making the new humankind, mestizaje in flesh and spirit. Mestizo is what is good. (1996: 104)

The third founding idea of *Nuestra America* is that for *Nuestra America* to be built upon its most genuine foundations, it has to endow itself with genuine knowledge. Martí again: “The trenches of ideas are worth more than the trenches of stone” (1963–1966: 6:16). But, to accomplish this, ideas must be rooted in the aspirations of oppressed peoples. Just as “the authentic mestizo has conquered the exotic Creole ... the imported book has been conquered in America by the natural man” (1963–1966: 6:17). Hence Martí’s appeal:

The European university must yield to the American university. The history of America, from the Incas to the present, must be taught letter perfect, even if that of the Argonauts of Greece is not taught. Our own Greece is preferable to that Greece that is not ours. We have greater need of it. National politicians must replace foreign and exotic politicians. Graft the world into our republics, but the trunk must be that of our republics. And let the conquered pedant be silent: there is no homeland of which the individual can be more proud than our unhappy American republics. (1963–1966: 6:18)

This situated knowledge, which demands a continuous attention to identity, behavior, and involvement in public life, is truly what distinguishes a country, not the imperial attribution of levels of civilization. Martí distinguishes the intellectual from the man whose life experience has made wise: “There is no fight between civilization and barbarism, rather between false erudition and nature” (1963–1966: 6:17).

*Nuestra America* thus carries a strong epistemological component. Rather than importing foreign ideas, one must find out about the specific

realities of the continent from a Latin American perspective. Ignoring or disdaining them has helped tyrants accede to power, as well as grounded the arrogance of the United States vis-à-vis the rest of the continent. “The contempt of the formidable neighbor who does not know her is the major threat to Nuestra America; and he must know her urgently to stop disdaining her. Being ignorant, he might perhaps covet her. Once he knew her, he would, out of respect, take his hand off her” (Martí 1963–1966: 6:22).

A situated knowledge is therefore the condition for a situated government. As Martí says elsewhere, one cannot

rule new peoples with a singular and violent composition, with laws inherited from four centuries of free practice in the United States, and nineteen centuries of monarchy in France. One does not stop the blow in the chest of the plainsman’s horse with one of Hamilton’s decrees. One does not clear the congealed blood of the Indian race with a sentence of Sieyès. (1963–1966: 6:16–17)

And, Martí adds, “In the republic of Indians, governors learn Indian” (1963–1966: 6:21).

A fourth founding idea of *Nuestra America* is that it is Caliban’s America, not Prospero’s.<sup>3</sup> Prospero’s America lies to the North, but it abides also in the South with those intellectual and political elites who reject the Indian and black roots and look upon Europe and the United States as models to be imitated and upon their own countries with the ethnocentric blinders that distinguish civilization and barbaric wilderness. Martí has particularly in mind one of the earliest Southern formulations of Prospero’s America, the work of Argentinian Domingo Sarmiento, titled *Civilization and Barbarism* and published in 1845. It is against this world of Prospero that Andrade pushes with his “Carib instinct”:

However, not the Crusaders came, rather the runaways from a

civilization we are now eating up, for we are strong and vengeful like the Jabuti.<sup>4</sup> ... We did not have speculation. But we did have divination. We had politics, which is the science of distribution. It is a social-planetary system.... Before the Portuguese discovered Brazil, Brazil had discovered happiness. (1990 [1928]: 47–51)

The fifth basic idea of *Nuestra America* is that its political thinking, far from being nationalistic, is rather internationalistic and strengthened by an anticolonialist and anti-imperialist stance, aimed at Europe in the past and now at the United States. Those who think that neoliberal globalization from NAFTA<sup>5</sup> to the Free Trade Initiative for the Americas and the World Trade Organization is something new should read Martí's reports on the Pan-American Congress of 1889–1890 and the American International Monetary Commission of 1891. Here are Martí's remarks on the Pan-American Congress:

Never in America, since independence, was there subject matter demanding more wisdom, requiring more vigilance or calling for clearer and closer attention than the invitation that the powerful United States, filled with unsalable products and determined to expand domination over America, addresses to the American nations with less power, linked by free, Europe-friendly trade, to form an alliance against Europe and cut off their contacts with the rest of the world. America managed to get rid of Spain's tyranny; now, having looked with judicious eyes upon the antecedent causes and factors of such an invitation, it is imperative to state, because it is true, that the time has come for Spanish America to declare her second independence. (1963–1966: 6:46)

According to Martí, the dominant conceptions in the United States concerning Latin America must incite the latter to distrust all proposals

coming from the North. Outraged, Martí accuses,

They believe in necessity, the barbaric right, as the only right, that "this will be ours because we need it." They believe in the incomparable superiority of the "Anglo-Saxon race as opposed to the Latin race." They believe in the baseness of the Negro race that they enslaved in the past and now-a-days humiliate, and of the Indian race, which they exterminate. They believe that the peoples of Spanish America are mainly constituted of Indians and Negros. (1963–1966: 6:160)

The fact that *Nuestra America* and European America are geographically so close, as well as the former's awareness of the dangers issuing from the power imbalance between both, soon forced *Nuestra America* to claim her autonomy in the form of a thought and a practice from the South: "The North must be left behind" (Martí 1963–1966: 2:368). Martí's insight derives from his many years of exile in New York, during which he became well acquainted with "the monster's entrails":

In the North there is neither support nor root. In the North the problems increase and there is no charity and patriotism to solve them. Here, men don't learn how to love one another, nor do they love the soil where they are born by chance.... Here are piled up the rich on one side and the desperate on the other. The North clams up and is full of hatred. The North must be left behind. (1963–1966: 2:367–368)

It would be difficult to find a more clairvoyant preview of the European American century and the need to create an alternative to it.

According to Martí, such an alternative resides in a united *Nuestra America* and the assertion of her autonomy vis-à-vis the United States. In a text dated 1894, Martí writes, "Little is known about our sociology

and about such precise laws as the following one: the farther away they keep from the United States, the freer and more prosperous will the peoples of America be" (1963–1966: 6:26–27). More ambitious and utopic is Oswald de Andrade's alternative: "We want the Caribbean Revolution greater than the French Revolution. One unification of all efficacious revolts on behalf of man. Without us, Europe would not even have its poor declaration of the rights of man" (1990 [1928]: 48).

In sum, for Martí the claim of equality grounds the struggle against unequal difference as much as the claim of difference grounds the struggle against inequality. The only legitimate cannibalization of difference (Andrade's anthropophagy) is the subaltern's because only through it can Caliban recognize his own difference with regard to the unequal differences imposed upon him. In other words, Andrade's anthropophagus digests according to his own guts.



### **The Baroque Ethos: Prolegomena for an Insurgent Cosmopolitan Politics and Culture**

*Nuestra America* is no mere intellectual construct for discussion in the salons that gave so much life to Latin American culture in the first decades of the twentieth century. It is a political project, or rather, a set of political projects and a commitment to the objectives therein contained. That was the commitment that dragged Martí into exile and later to death fighting for Cuba's independence. As Oswald de Andrade was to say epigrammatically, "Against the vegetal elites. In contact with the soil" (1990 [1928]: 49). But before it becomes a political project, *Nuestra America* is a form of subjectivity and sociability. It is a way of being and living permanently in transit and transitoriness, crossing borders, creating borderland spaces, open to risk—with which it has lived for many years, long before the invention of the "risk society" (Beck 1992)—accustomed to enduring a very low level of stabilization of expectations in the name of a visceral optimism before collective potentiality. Such optimism led Martí to assert in a period of fin-de-siècle Viennese cultural pessimism, "A governor in a new nation means a creator" (1963–1966: 6:17). The same kind of optimism made Andrade exclaim, "Joy is counterproof" (1990 [1928]: 51).

The subjectivity and sociability of *Nuestra America* are uncomfortable with institutionalized, legalistic thought and comfortable with utopian thinking. By utopia I mean the imagination's exploration of new modes of human possibility and styles of will and the confrontation by imagination of the necessity of whatever exists—just because it exists—on behalf of something radically better that is worth fighting for and to which humanity is fully entitled (Santos 1995: 479). This style of subjectivity and sociability is what I call, following Bolívar Echeverría (1994, 2011), the *baroque ethos*.<sup>6</sup>

Whether as an artistic style or as a historical epoch, the baroque is most specifically a Latin and Mediterranean phenomenon, an eccentric

form of modernity, the South of the North, so to speak. Its eccentricity derives, to a large extent, from the fact that it occurred in countries and historical moments in which the center of power was weak and tried to hide its weakness by dramatizing conformist sociability. The relative lack of central power endows the baroque with an open-ended and unfinished character that allows for the autonomy and creativity of the margins and peripheries. Because of its eccentricity and exaggeration, the center reproduces itself as if it were a margin. I mean a centrifugal imagination that becomes stronger as we go from the internal peripheries of the European power to its external peripheries in Latin America. The whole of Latin America was colonized by weak centers, Portugal and Spain. Portugal was a hegemonic center during a brief period, between the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, and Spain started to decline but a century later. From the seventeenth century onward, the colonies were more or less left alone, a marginalization that made possible a specific cultural and social creativity, now highly codified, now chaotic, now erudite, now vernacular, now official, now illegal. Such *mestizaje* is so deeply rooted in the social practices of these countries that it came to be considered as grounding a cultural ethos that is typically Latin American and has prevailed since the seventeenth century until today.<sup>7</sup> This form of baroque, inasmuch as it is the manifestation of an extreme instance of the center's weakness, constitutes a privileged field for the development of a centrifugal, subversive, and blasphemous imagination.

As an epoch in European history, the baroque is a time of crisis and transition. I mean the economic, social, and political crisis that is particularly obvious in the case of the powers that fostered the first phase of European expansion. In Portugal's case, the crisis implies even the loss of independence. Due to issues of monarchic succession, Portugal was annexed to Spain in 1580 and only regained its independence in 1640. The Spanish monarchy, particularly under Filipe IV (1621–1665), underwent a serious financial crisis that was actually also a political and cultural crisis. As José Antonio Maravall has pointed out, it begins as a certain awareness of uneasiness and restlessness, which “gets worse as the

social fabric is seriously affected” (1990: 57). For instance, values and behaviors are questioned, the structure of classes undergoes some changes, banditism and deviant behavior in general increase, and revolt and sedition are constant threats. It is indeed a time of crisis, but also of transition toward new modes of sociability made possible by emergent capitalism and the new scientific paradigm, as well as toward new modes of political domination based not only on coercion but also on cultural and ideological integration. To a large extent, baroque culture is one such instrument for the consolidation and legitimation of power. What nonetheless seems to me inspiring in baroque culture is its grain of subversion and eccentricity, the weakness of the centers of power that look for legitimation in it, the space of creativity and imagination it opens up, and the turbulent sociability that it fosters. The configuration of baroque subjectivity that I wish to advance here is a collage of diverse historical and cultural materials, some of which in fact cannot be considered technically as belonging to the baroque period.

Baroque subjectivity lives comfortably with the temporary suspension of order and canons. As a subjectivity of transition, it depends both on the exhaustion and the aspiration of canons; its privileged temporality is perennial transitoriness. It lacks the obvious certainties of universal laws—in the same way that baroque style lacked the classical universalism of the Renaissance. Because it is unable to plan its own repetition ad infinitum, baroque subjectivity invests in the local, the particular, the momentary, the ephemeral, and the transitory. But the local is not lived in a localist fashion, that is, it is not experienced as an orthotopia; the local aspires, rather, to invent another place, a heterotopia, if not even a utopia. Since it derives from a deep feeling of emptiness and disorientation caused by the exhaustion of the dominant canons, the comfort provided by the local is not the comfort of rest but a sense of direction. Again, we can observe here a contrast with the Renaissance, as Heinrich Wölfflin has taught us: “In contrast to the Renaissance, which sought permanence and repose in everything, the baroque had from the first moment a definite *sense of direction*” (1979: 67, emphasis added).

Baroque subjectivity is contemporaneous with all the elements that it integrates and hence contemptuous of modernist evolutionism. Thus, we might say, baroque temporality is the temporality of interruption. Interruption is important on two accounts; it allows for reflexivity and surprise. Its reflexivity is the self-reflexivity required by the lack of maps (without maps to guide our steps, we must tread with double care). Without self-reflexivity, in a desert of canons, the desert itself becomes canonical. Surprise, in turn, is really suspense; it derives from the suspension accomplished by interruption. By momentarily suspending itself, baroque subjectivity intensifies the will and arouses passion. The "baroque technique," argues Maravall, consists of "suspending resolution so as to encourage it, after that provisional and transitory moment of arrest, to push further more efficiently with the help of those retained and concentrated forces" (1990: 445).

Interruption provokes wonder and novelty and impedes closure and completion—hence the unfinished and open-ended character of baroque sociability. The capacity for wonder, surprise, and novelty is the energy that facilitates the struggle for an aspiration that is all the more convincing because it can never be completely fulfilled. The aim of baroque style, says Wölfflin, "is not to represent a perfect state, but to suggest an incomplete process and a moment towards its completion" (1979: 67).

Baroque subjectivity has a very special relationship with forms. The geometry of baroque subjectivity is not Euclidean; it is fractal. The suspension of forms results from the extreme uses to which they are put: Maravall's "extremosidad" (1990: 421). As regards baroque subjectivity, forms are the exercise of freedom par excellence. The great importance of the exercise of freedom justifies that forms be treated with extreme seriousness, though the extremism may result in the destruction of the forms themselves. The reason Michelangelo is rightly considered one of the baroque's forefathers is, according to Wölfflin, "because he treated forms with a violence, a terrible seriousness which could only find expression in formlessness" (1979: 82). This is what Michelangelo's

contemporaries called *terribilità*. Extremism in the use of forms is grounded on a will to grandiosity that is also the will to astound so well formulated by Bernini: “Let no one speak to me of what is small” (Tapié 1988: 188). Extremism may be exercised in many different ways, to highlight simplicity or even asceticism as well as exuberance and extravagance, as Maravall has pointed out. Baroque extremism allows for ruptures emerging out of apparent continuities and keeps the forms in a permanently unstable state of bifurcation, in Ilya Prigogine’s (1997) terms. One of the most eloquent examples is Bernini’s *The Mystical Ecstasy of Santa Teresa*. In this sculpture, St. Teresa’s expression is dramatized in such a way that the most intensely religious representation of the saint is one with the profane representation of a woman enjoying a deep orgasm. The representation of the sacred glides surreptitiously into the representation of the sacrilegious. The extremism of forms alone allows baroque subjectivity to entertain the turbulence and excitement necessary to continue the struggle for emancipatory causes, in a world in which emancipation has been collapsed into or absorbed by hegemonic regulation. To speak of extremism is to speak of an archaeological excavation of the regulatory magma in order to retrieve emancipatory fires, no matter how dim.

The same extremism that produces forms also devours them. This voracity takes on two forms: *sfumato* and *mestizaje*. In baroque painting, *sfumato* is the blurring of outlines and colors among objects, as clouds and mountains or the sea and the sky. *Sfumato* allows baroque subjectivity to create the near and the familiar among different intelligibilities, thus making cross-cultural dialogues possible and desirable. For instance, only by resorting to *sfumato* is it possible to give form to configurations that combine Western human rights with other conceptions of human dignity existing in other cultures (Santos 2007a: 3–40). As the coherence of monolithic constructions disintegrates, their free-floating fragments remain open to new coherences and the invention of new multicultural forms. *Sfumato* is like a magnet that attracts the fragmentary forms into new constellations and directions, appealing to

their most vulnerable, unfinished, open-ended contours. *Sfumato* is, in sum, an antifortress militancy.

*Mestizaje*, in its turn, is a way of pushing *sfumato* to its utmost or extreme. While *sfumato* operates through the disintegration of forms and the retrieval of fragments, *mestizaje* operates through the creation of new constellations of meaning, which are truly unrecognizable or blasphemous in light of their constitutive fragments. *Mestizaje* resides in the destruction of the logic that presides over the formation of each of its fragments and in the construction of a new logic. This productive-destructive process tends to reflect the power relations among the original cultural forms (that is, among their supporting social groups), and this is why baroque subjectivity favors the *mestizajes* in which power relations are replaced by shared authority (mestiza authority). Latin America has provided a particularly fertile soil for *mestizaje*, and so the region is one of the most important excavation sites for the construction of baroque subjectivity.<sup>8</sup> The postcolonial critique of *mestizaje* allows for new and empowering forms of *mestizaje* (more on this below).

*Sfumato* and *mestizaje* are the two constitutive elements of what I call, following Fernando Ortiz, *transculturation*. In his justly famous book, *Contrapunteo cubano*, originally published in 1940, Ortiz proposes the concept of *transculturation* to define the synthesis of the utterly intricate cultural processes of deculturation and neoculturation that have always characterized Cuban society. In his thinking, the reciprocal cultural shocks and discoveries, which in Europe occurred slowly throughout more than four millennia, occurred in Cuba by sudden jumps in less than four centuries (Ortiz 1973: 131). The pre-Colombian *transculturations* between paleolithic and neolithic Indians were followed by many others after the European “hurricane” among various European cultures and between those and various African and Asian cultures. According to Ortiz (1973: 132), what distinguishes Cuba since the sixteenth century is the fact that all its cultures and peoples were equally invaders, exogenous, all of them torn apart from their original cradles, haunted by separation and transplantation to a new culture being created.

This permanent maladjustment and transitoriness allowed for new cultural constellations that cannot be reduced to the sum of the different fragments that contributed to them. The positive character of this constant process of transition between cultures is what Ortiz designates as *transculturation*.<sup>9</sup> To reinforce this positive, new character, I prefer to speak of *sfumato* instead of deculturation and *mestizaje* instead of neoculturation. Transculturation designates, therefore, the voraciousness and extremism with which cultural forms are processed by baroque sociability. This selfsame voraciousness and selfsame extremism are also quite present in Oswald de Andrade's concept of anthropophagy.

The extremism with which forms are lived by baroque subjectivity stresses the rhetorical artifactuality of practices, discourses, and modes of intelligibility. Artifice (*artificium*) is the foundation of a subjectivity suspended among fragments. Artifice allows baroque subjectivity to reinvent itself whenever the sociabilities to which it leads transform themselves into micro-orthodoxies. Through artifice, baroque subjectivity is ludic and subversive at one time, as the baroque feast so well illustrates. The importance of the feast in baroque culture, both in Europe and in Latin America, is well documented.<sup>10</sup> The feast turned baroque culture into the first instance of a mass culture of modernity. Political and ecclesiastical powers used its ostentatious and celebratory character to dramatize their greatness and reinforce their control over the masses. However, through its three basic components—disproportion, laughter, and subversion—the baroque feast is invested with an emancipatory potential.

The baroque feast is out of proportion; it requires an extremely large investment that is nevertheless consumed in an extremely fleeting moment and an extremely limited space. As Maravall says, "Abundant and expensive means are used, a considerable effort is exerted, ample preparations are made, a complicated apparatus is set up, all only to obtain some extremely short-lived effects, whether in the form of pleasure or surprise" (1990: 488). Nevertheless, disproportion generates a special intensification that in turn gives rise to a will for motion, a tolerance for

chaos, and a taste for turbulence, without which the struggle for the paradigmatic transition cannot take place.

Disproportion makes wonder, surprise, artifice, and novelty possible. But, above all, it makes playful distance and laughter possible. Because laughter is not easily codifiable, capitalist modernity declared war on mirth, and so laughter was considered frivolous, improper, and eccentric, if not blasphemous. Laughter was to be admitted only in highly codified contexts of the entertainment industry. This phenomenon can also be observed among modern anticapitalist social movements (labor parties, unions, and even the new social movements), which banned laughter and play lest they subvert the seriousness of resistance. Particularly interesting is the case of unions, whose activities in the beginning had a strong ludic and festive element (workers' feasts) that, however, was gradually suffocated, until at last union activity became deadly serious and deeply antierotic. The banishment of laughter and play is part of what Max Weber calls the disenchantment (*Entzäuberung*) of the modern world.

The reinvention of social emancipation, which I suggest can be achieved by delving into baroque sociability, aims at the reenchantment of common sense, which in itself presupposes the carnivalization of emancipatory social practices and the eroticism of laughter and play. The carnivalization of emancipatory social practice has an important self-reflective dimension; it makes the decanonization and subversion of such practices possible. A decanonizing practice that does not know how to decanonize itself falls easily into orthodoxy. Likewise, a subversive activity that does not know how to subvert itself falls easily into regulatory routine.

And now, finally, the third emancipatory feature of the baroque feast: subversion. By carnivalizing social practices, the baroque feast displays a subversive potential that increases as the feast distances itself from the centers of power and that is always there, even when the centers of power themselves are the promoters of the feast. Little wonder, then, that this subversive feature was much more noticeable in the colonies. Writing



about carnival in the 1920s, the great Peruvian intellectual Mariátegui asserted that, even though it had been appropriated by the bourgeoisie, carnival was indeed revolutionary because, by turning the bourgeois into a wardrobe, it was a merciless parody of power and the past (1974b [1925–1927]: 127). Antonio García de León also describes the subversive dimension of baroque feasts and religious processions in the Mexican port of Vera Cruz in the seventeenth century. Up front marched the highest dignitaries of the viceroyalty in their full regalia—politicians, clergymen, and military men; at the end of the procession followed the populace, mimicking their “betters” in gesture and attire and thus provoking laughter and merriment among the spectators (León 1993). This symmetrical inversion of the beginning and end of the procession is a cultural metaphor for the upside-down world—*el mundo al revés*—that was typical of Vera Cruz sociability at the time: *mulattas* dressed as queens, slaves in silk garments, whores pretending to be honest women and honest women pretending to be whores, Africanized Portuguese and Indianized Spaniards.<sup>11</sup> The same *mundo al revés* is celebrated by Oswald de Andrade in his *Anthropophagous Manifesto*: “But we have never admitted the birth of logic among us.... Only where there is mystery is there no determinism. But what have we to do with this? We have never been catechized. We live in a sleepwalking law. We made Christ be born in Bahia. Or in Belém-Pará” (1990 [1928]: 48).

In the feast, subversion is codified, in that it transgresses order while knowing the place of order and not questioning it; yet, the code itself is subverted by the *sfumato* between feast and daily sociability. In the peripheries, transgression is almost a necessity. It is transgressive because it does not know how to be order, even as it knows that order exists. That is why baroque subjectivity privileges margins and peripheries as fields for the reconstruction of emancipatory energies.

All these characteristics turn the sociability generated by baroque subjectivity into a subcodified sociability; somewhat chaotic, inspired by a centrifugal imagination, positioned between despair and vertigo, this is a kind of sociability that celebrates revolt and revolutionizes celebration.

Such sociability cannot but be emotional and passionate, the feature that most distinguishes baroque subjectivity from high modernity, or first modernity in Scott Lash's (1999) terms. High modern rationality, particularly after René Descartes, condemns the emotions and the passions as obstacles to the progress of knowledge and truth. Cartesian rationality, says Stephen Toulmin, claims to be "intellectually perfectionist, morally rigorous and humanly unrelenting" (1990: 198). Not much of human life and social practice fits into such a conception of rationality, but it is nonetheless quite attractive to those who cherish the stability and hierarchy of universal rules. Albert Hirschman, in his turn, has clearly shown the elective affinities between this form of rationality and emergent capitalism. Inasmuch as the interests of people and groups began centering on economic advantage, the interests that before had been considered passions became the opposite, and even the tapers, of passion. From then on, says Hirschman, "in the pursuit of their interests men were expected or assumed to be steadfast, single-minded and methodical, in total contrast to the stereotyped behavior of men who are buffeted and blinded by their passions" (1977: 54). The objective was, of course, to create a "one-dimensional" human personality. And Hirschman concludes, "In sum, capitalism was supposed to accomplish exactly what was soon to be denounced as its worst feature" (1977: 132).

Cartesian and capitalist recipes are of little use for the reconstruction of a human personality with the capacity and desire for social emancipation. The meaning of the emancipatory struggles at the beginning of the twenty-first century can be deduced neither from demonstrative knowledge nor from an estimate of interests. Thus, the excavation undertaken by baroque subjectivity in this domain, more than in any other, must concentrate on suppressed or eccentric traditions of modernity, representations that occurred in the physical or symbolic peripheries where the control of hegemonic representations was weaker—the Vera Cruzes of modernity—or earlier, more chaotic representations of modernity that occurred before the Cartesian closure. For example, baroque subjectivity looks for inspiration in Montaigne and the concrete

and erotic intelligibility of his life. In his essay "On Experience," after saying that he hates remedies that are more troublesome than the disease, Montaigne writes,

To be a victim of the colic and to subject oneself to abstinence from the pleasure of eating oysters, are two evils instead of one. The disease stabs us on one side, the diet on the other. Since there is the risk of mistake let us take it, for preference, in the pursuit of pleasure. The world does the opposite, and considers nothing to be useful that is not painful; facility rouses suspicions. (1958: 370)

As Ernst Cassirer (1960, 1963) and Toulmin (1990) have shown for the Renaissance and the Enlightenment, respectively, each era creates a subjectivity that is congruent with the new intellectual, social, political, and cultural challenges. The baroque ethos is the building block of a form of subjectivity and sociability interested in and capable of confronting the hegemonic forms of globalization, thereby opening the space for counterhegemonic possibilities. Such possibilities are not fully developed and cannot by themselves promise a new era. But they are consistent enough to provide the grounding for the idea that we are entering a period of paradigmatic transition, an in-between era and therefore an era that is eager to follow the impulse of *mestizaje*, *sfumato*, hybridization, and all the other features that I have attributed to the baroque ethos, hence to *Nuestra America*. The progressive credibility conquered by the forms of subjectivity and sociability nurtured by such an ethos will gradually translate into new interstitial normativities. Both Martí and Andrade have in mind a new kind of law and a new kind of rights. For them the right to be equal involves the right to be different, as the right to be different involves the right to be equal. Andrade's metaphor of anthropophagy is a call for such a complex interlegality. It is formulated from the perspective of subaltern difference, the only "other" recognized by Eurocentric high modernity. The interstitial normative fragments we collect in *Nuestra*

*America* will provide the seeds for a new insurgent cosmopolitan politics and law, a politics and law from below, to be found in the streets where survival and creative transgression fuse in an everyday-life pattern.

### **The Limits of *Nuestra America***

The *Nuestra America* century was one of counterhegemonic possibilities, many of them following the tradition of others in the nineteenth century after the independence of Haiti in 1804. Among such possibilities, we might count the Mexican Revolution of 1910; the indigenous movement headed by Quintín Lame in Colombia in 1914; the Sandinista movement in Nicaragua in the 1920s and 1930s and its triumph in the 1980s; the radical democratization of Guatemala in 1944; the rise of Peronism in 1946; the indigenous, peasant, and miners revolution of 1952 in Bolivia, followed in recent years by the election of the first indigenous president, Evo Morales; the triumph of the Cuban Revolution in 1959; Salvador Allende's rise to power in 1970; the Landless Workers' Movement in Brazil since the 1980s; the rise of the indigenous movement in Ecuador in 1990 and the long road to the 2008 Montecristi constitution; the Zapatista movement since 1994; the World Social Forum born in Porto Alegre, Brazil, in 2001; and the progressive governments of the first decade of the new century in Brazil, Venezuela, Argentina, Bolivia, and Ecuador, among others.

However, the list of the defeats of the popular movements caused by internal oligarchies and imperial powers is much greater and includes civil and military dictatorships, foreign interventions, the war on communism, massive violations of human rights, extrajudicial executions by paramilitary militias, and so on. As a result, throughout the twentieth century *Nuestra America* became a fertile field of cosmopolitan, emancipatory, counterhegemonic experiences, as exhilarating as painful, as radiant in their promises as frustrating in their fulfillments.

What failed and why in the *Nuestra America* century? It would be silly to propose an inventory before such an open future as ours. Nonetheless, I will risk a few thoughts. In the first place, to live in the "monster's entrails" is no easy matter. It does allow for a deep knowledge of the beast, as Martí so well demonstrates; on the other hand, it makes it

very difficult to come out alive, even when one heeds Martí's admonishment: "The North must be left behind" (1963–1966: 368). To my way of thinking, *Nuestra America* has been living doubly in the monster's entrails because it shares with European America the continent that the latter has always conceived of as its vital space and zone of privileged influence and because, as Martí says in "Nuestra America," "nuestra America is the working America" (1963–1966: 6:23), and thus, in its relations with European America, it shares the same tensions and sorrows that plague the relations between workers and capitalists. In this latter sense, *Nuestra America* has failed no more and no less than the workers of the whole world in their struggle against capital.

Second, *Nuestra America* did not have to fight only against the imperial visits of its northern neighbor. The latter took over and became at home in the South, not just socializing with the natives but itself becoming native in the form of local elites and their transnational alliances with US interests. The Southern Prospero was present in Domingo Sarmiento's political-cultural project, in the interests of the agrarian and industrial bourgeoisie, especially after World War II, in the military dictatorships of the 1960s and 1970s, in the fight against the communist threat, and in the drastic neoliberal structural adjustment. In this sense, *Nuestra America* has had to live trapped in and dependent on European America, just like Caliban vis-à-vis Prospero. That is why Latin American violence has taken the form as much of civil war as of the Bay of Pigs.

The third thought concerns a certain triumphalist postmodernism *avant la lettre* about the novel social value of *mestizaje*, which left unexamined the social processes through which *mestizaje* came about. Untold violence and destruction of life were thereby swept under the façade of a benevolent *mestizaje*. The latter became the self-serving narrative of whites and white mestizos. Not surprisingly, this concept of *mestizaje* became a target of the indigenous peoples and Afrodescendent movements and struggles. The colonial *mestizaje* was to be strictly distinguished from a postcolonial or decolonial *mestizaje*, the white

mestizo *mestizaje* from the dark mestizo *mestizaje*. The above movements and struggles were instrumental in forcing into the open such distinctions, and Frantz Fanon provided them with the most eloquent and forceful arguments. Such distinctions were crucial to identify differences on the basis of which alliances could be sought. In fact, one of the weaknesses of *Nuestra America*, actually quite obvious in Martí's work, was its overestimation of the communality of interests and the possibilities of uniting around them. Because of the unexamined differences and the conflicts they could generate, rather than uniting, *Nuestra America* underwent a process of political fragmentation.

My final thought concerns the cultural project of *Nuestra America* itself. To my mind, contrary to Martí's wishes, the European and North American university never gave way entirely to the American university, as witness the

pathetic bovaryism of writers and scholars ... which leads some Latin Americans ... to imagine themselves as exiled metropolitans. For them, a work produced in their immediate orbit ... merits their interest only when it has received the metropolis' approval, an approval that gives them the eyes with which to see it. (Retamar 1989: 82)

Contrary to Ortiz's claim, transculturation was never total, and in fact it was undermined by power differences among the different components that contributed to it. For a very long time (and perhaps even more so today, at a time of vertiginous deterritorialized transculturation in the guise of hybridization) the questions about the inequality of power remained unanswered: Who hybridizes whom and what? With what results? And to whose benefit? What, in the process of transculturation, did not go beyond deculturation or sfumato and why? In sum, the crucial differences between a colonial *mestizaje* and a decolonial *mestizaje* were never examined. If indeed it is true that most cultures were invaders, it is no less true that some invaded as masters, some as slaves. It is perhaps

not risky today, eighty years later, to think that Oswald de Andrade's anthropophagous optimism was exaggerated: "But no Crusaders came. Only runaways from a civilization that we are eating up, because we are strong and vengeful like the Jabuti" (1990 [1928]: 50).



### Counterhegemonic Possibilities for the Twenty-First Century

In the light of the preceding, we must ask whether in fact *Nuestra America* harbors the conditions necessary to continue to symbolize a utopian will to emancipation and counterhegemonic globalization based on the mutual implication of equality and difference. My answer is positive but depends on the following condition: *Nuestra America* must be deterritorialized and turned into a metaphor for the struggle of the victims of hegemonic globalization wherever they may be, North or South, East or West. If we revisit the founding ideas of *Nuestra America*, we observe that the transformations of the last decades have created conditions for them to occur and flourish today in other parts of the world. Let us examine some of them.

First, the exponential increase of transborder interactions—of emigrants, students, and refugees, as well as executives and tourists—is giving rise to new forms of *mestizaje*, anthropophagy, and transculturation all over the world. The world becomes increasingly a world of invaders who are cut off from an origin they never had, or if they did have such an origin, who suffered there the original experience of being invaded. More attention must be paid than in the first century of *Nuestra America* to the power of the different participants in the processes of *mestizaje*. Such inequalities accounted for the perversion both of the politics of difference (recognition became a form of miscognition) and the politics of equality (redistribution ended up as the new form of poverty relief advocated by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund). Second, the recent ugly revival of racism in the global North and even in the global South points to an aggressive defense against the unstoppable construction of the multiple little humankinds Bolívar talked about, in which races cross and interpenetrate in the margins of repression and discrimination. As the Cuban, in Martí's voice, could proclaim to be more than black, mulatto, or white, so the South African, the Mozambican, the New Yorker, the Parisian, and the Londoner can

proclaim today to be more than black, white, mulatto, Indian, Kurd, Arab, and so on.<sup>12</sup> Third, the demand to produce or sustain situated and contextualized knowledge is today a global claim against the ignorance and silencing effect produced by modern science as it is used by hegemonic globalization. This epistemological issue gained enormous relevance in recent times with the newest developments in biotechnology and genetic engineering and the consequent struggle to defend biodiversity from biopiracy. In this domain, Latin America, one of the great holders of biodiversity, continues to be the home of *Nuestra America*, but many other countries are in this position in Africa and in Asia (Santos, Meneses, and Arriscado 2007).

Fourth, as hegemonic globalization has deepened, the “entrails of the monster” have gotten closer to many other peoples on other continents. The closeness effect is today produced by information and communication capitalism and by consumer society. Hereby are multiplied both the grounds for cynical reason and the postcolonial impulse. In a word, as a metaphor, the new *Nuestra America* today has the conditions necessary to globalize itself and thereby propose new emancipatory alliances to the old *Nuestra America*.

The counterhegemonic nature of *Nuestra America* lies in its potential to develop a progressive transnational political culture.<sup>13</sup> Such a political culture will concentrate on (1) identifying the multiple local/global linkages among struggles, movements, and initiatives; (2) promoting the clashes between hegemonic globalization trends and pressures, on one side, and the transnational coalitions to resist against them, on the other, thus opening up possibilities for counter-hegemonic globalizations; and (3) promoting internal and external self-reflexivity so that the forms of redistribution, recognition, and accountability inside the movements mirror the forms of redistribution, recognition, and accountability that the insurgent cosmopolitanism and its emancipatory politics wish to see implemented in the world.

### Conclusion: Which Side Are You On, Ariel?

Starting from an analysis of *Nuestra America* as the subaltern view of the American continent throughout the twentieth century, I identified *Nuestra America*'s counterhegemonic potential and indicated some of the reasons why it failed to fulfill itself. Revisiting the historical trajectory of *Nuestra America* and its cultural conscience, the baroque ethos, I then reconstructed the forms of sociability and subjectivity that might be interested in and capable of confronting the challenges posed by counterhegemonic globalizations. The symbolic expansion made possible by a metaphorical interpretation of *Nuestra America* allows one to view the latter as the blueprint of the new transnational political culture called for in the new century and millennium. The normative claims of this political culture are embedded in the lived experiences of the people for whom *Nuestra America* speaks. Such claims point to a new kind of situated, insurgent, decolonial, intercultural, bottom-up, cosmopolitan culture and politics.

However, in order not to repeat the frustrations of the last century, this symbolic expansion must go one step further and include the most neglected trope in the *Nuestra America* mythos: Ariel, the spirit of air in Shakespeare's *The Tempest*. Like Caliban, Ariel too is Prospero's slave. However, besides not being deformed like Caliban, he gets much better treatment from Prospero, who promises him freedom if he serves Prospero faithfully. As we have seen, *Nuestra America* has looked upon itself predominantly as Caliban in constant and unequal struggle against Prospero. This is how Andrade, Aimé Césaire, Edward Brathwaite, George Lamming, Roberto Retamar, and many others see it (Retamar 1989: 13). While this is the dominant vision, it is not the only one. For instance, in 1898 the Franco-Argentinian writer Paul Groussac spoke of the need to defend the old European and Latin American civilization against the "Calibanesque Yankee" (Retamar 1989: 10). On the other hand, the ambiguous figure of Ariel inspired several interpretations. In 1900, the writer José Enrique Rodó published his essay titled "Ariel," in

which he identifies Latin America with Ariel, while North America gets identified implicitly with Caliban. In 1935, the Argentine Aníbal Ponce saw in Ariel the intellectual, tied to Prospero in a less brutal way than Caliban but nonetheless at his service, much according to the model that Renaissance humanism conceived for intellectuals: a mixture of slave and mercenary, indifferent to action and conformist vis-à-vis the established order (Retamar 1989: 12). This is the intellectual Ariel reinvented by Aimé Césaire in his play of the late 1960s: *Une tempête: Adaptation de "La tempête" de Shakespeare pour un théâtre nègre*. Now turned into a mulatto, Ariel is the intellectual permanently in crisis.

This said, I suggest it is high time we gave a new symbolic identification to Ariel and ascertain his usefulness for the promotion of the emancipatory ideal of *Nuestra America*. I shall conclude, therefore, by presenting Ariel as a baroque angel undergoing three transfigurations.

His first transfiguration is as Césaire's mulatto Ariel. Against racism and xenophobia, Ariel represents transculturation and multiculturalism, a *mestizaje* of flesh and spirit, as Darcy Ribeiro would say. In this *mestizaje* the possibility of interracial and intercultural dialogue is inscribed. The mulatto Ariel is the metaphor of a possible synthesis between recognition and equality. But this *mestizaje* is different from the one that dominated the first century of *Nuestra America*. The old *mestizaje* was the white mestizo's *mestizaje*, not the dark mestizo's *mestizaje*. It was a *mestizaje* with little concern for the relations of production of *mestizaje* and, to that extent, served as a cover-up for much violence and discrimination. The new *mestizaje* is a decolonial *mestizaje*, and the mestizo Ariel cannot but be a Fanonian Ariel.

Ariel's second transfiguration is as Antonio Gramsci's intellectual, who exercises selfreflectivity in order to know on whose side he is and of what use he can be. More than that, he must become the rearguard theorist. This Ariel is unequivocally on the side of Caliban, on the side of all the oppressed peoples and groups of the world, and keeps a constant epistemological and political vigilance over himself, lest his help become useless or even counterproductive. This Ariel is an intellectual trained in

Martí's university.

Following from this, the third transfiguration is an epistemological one. Once Ariel joins Caliban in the quest for liberation, the knowledge born in struggle becomes the most reliable source of insight and orientation. As the African proverb goes, it is time for the story of the hunting to be told from the standpoint of the lion rather than from that of the hunter, as has always been the case under colonialism. This demands a profound change in the ways knowledge is produced and validated. It amounts to a break with what I call, in the following chapters, *Northern epistemologies*.

In these symbolic transfigurations reside the foundations for transnational emancipatory politics and thus for counterhegemonic globalizations. Following the symbolic expansion of the *Nuestra America* metaphor proposed here, the second century of *Nuestra America* only makes sense as a broad constellation of *Nuestras Americas* in Africa, Asia, and Europe, all of them depending on deep, enduring, and truly decolonizing alliances between Ariel and Caliban.

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1. On the relations between the pope and the feudal lords concerning the Crusades, see Gibbon (1928: 631).

2. I analyze in detail the emergence of societal fascism as a consequence of the breakdown of the logic of the social contract in Santos (2002b: 447–458).

3. In this chapter, I use the names of Prospero and Caliban, from Shakespeare's *The Tempest* (1611), to signify that the colonial contact zone emerged as a contact zone between the “civilized” and the “savage.”

4. A medium-sized tortoise described in Brazilian Indian folk tales as being very strong, patient, and resilient.

5. The North American Free Trade Agreement between the United States, Canada, and Mexico entered into force in 1994, the same date as the uprising of the Zapatista Army of National Liberation of Chiapas.

6. The baroque ethos I propound here is very different from Scott Lash's “baroque melancholy” (1999: 330). Our differences are due in part to the different loci of the baroque we base our analysis in, Europe in the case of Lash, Latin America in my case.

7. See below the postcolonial critique of *mestizaje*.

8. Among others, see Pastor et al. (1993) and Alberro (1992). With reference to the Brazilian baroque, Coutinho (1990: 16) speaks of “a complex baroque *mestiçagem*.” See also the concept of the “Black Atlantic” (Gilroy 1993) to express the *mestiçaje* that characterizes black cultural experience, an experience that is not specifically African, American, Caribbean, or British but all of them at one and the same time. In the Portuguese-speaking world, the *Anthropophagous Manifesto* of Oswald de Andrade remains the most striking exemplar of *mestiçagem*.

9. From a postcolonial perspective, the concept of transculturation is highly questionable since it does not duly valorize the claim of difference. Cuban emergent black movements, for example, raise many questions in this regard.

10. On the baroque feast in Mexico (Vera Cruz), see León (1993); in Brazil (Minas Gerais), see Ávila (1994). The relationship between the feast, particularly the baroque feast, and utopian thinking remains to be explored. On the relationship between *fouriérisme* and *la société festive*, see Desroche (1975).

11. Ávila concurs, stressing the mixture of religious and heathen motifs: “Amongst hordes of negroes playing bagpipes, drums, fifes, and trumpets, there would be, for example, an excellent German impersonator ‘tearing apart the silence of the air with the loud sound of a clarinet,’ while the believers devoutly carried religious banners or images” (1994: 56).

12. According to both Martí and Bolívar, and in tune with Enlightenment postulates, the crucial step toward emancipation was to eliminate difference, rather than to take it as a constellation of equal differences. Later, the pan-Africanists assumed negritude as a condition to acquire equality, that is to say, the difference that does not erase history, the colonial wound.

13. It was surely no coincidence that the most consistent manifestation of counterhegemonic globalization in the first decade of the twenty-first century—the World Social Forum—occurred in Latin America (Santos 2006b).